Under New York law, mistake defense applies to which mental states?

• A. Intentional, Knowing, Reckless mistakes may be a defense; Criminal negligence: reasonable mistake
• B. Only for strict liability offenses
• C. For all offenses including strict liability
• D. Never a defense

Answer: (C)

The thing being tested is how a mistaken belief about facts can negate the required mental state for a criminal charge. In New York, liability turns on mens rea—the mental state the statute requires. If a defendant honestly and reasonably mistakes facts in a way that negates that required mental state (for example, a mistaken belief that would make the person act without the necessary intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence), the defense can apply.

This defense is broad because it targets the presence or absence of the mental state itself. If a defendant’s mistake would mean he didn’t have the culpable mindset the statute requires, he can raise the defense, and that can be true even when the statute is described as strict liability. In such cases, while the statute does not require proof of a mental state, the surrounding conduct and the defendant’s reasonable beliefs about those facts can still undermine the basis for convicting under the particular act.

So, the defense tracks the mental-state element across offenses: it can negate intent, knowledge, recklessness, or negligence, and in the broad sense even applies to situations characterized as strict liability. That’s why this option is the best fit.

In short, a genuine, reasonable mistake of fact can defeat the required mental state in many offenses, and functionally, this principle extends to offenses labeled as strict liability in New York practice.